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But let’s go back to the beginning of the story when my very good friend @0xrb found in his honeypot this new “ Mirai like ” Linux malware, which has important differences with the Mirai implementation. The beginning of the story: another IoT malware in the wild?
Sysdig discovered the threat when it found in its cloud honeypot a strange bucket using a compromised account. The fix: Use encryption for all your Git configuration; avoid committing sensitive data, including credentials; and set strict access requirements for your repositories. The tools are found on underground marketplaces.
The purpose of the script is to optimize the mining module by querying the information about the CPU through the reading of the “ /proc/cpu ” and when the manufacturer is retrieved the script provides to add some specific registry values depending by the vendor through the Model-Specific Register utility “ wrmsr ”. This is the “ Stage 1 ”.
Operating technology (OT), also known as the industrial internet of things (IIoT), uses smart pumps, conveyor belts, motors, and manufacturing equipment — and the operations teams that install the devices may not always inform the network security team about them. Critical resources need additional protection.
The DazzleSpy backdoor software had interesting features to foil detection, including end-to-end encryption to avoid firewall inspection as well as a feature that cut off communication if a TLS-inspection proxy was detected. Manufactured BackDoor Vulnerabilities. Deploy data encryption at rest and in transit.
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