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Researchers from MalwareHunterTeam discovered a suspicious RAR filenamed “COVID-19-” that was being distributed online, likely through phishing emails. "Important The RAR archive contains a filenamed “Important – COVID-19” that displays a Word icon. "Important – COVID-19.rar"
“The bot is embedded into the ToxicEye RAT configuration file and compiled into an executable file (an example of a filename we found was ‘paypal checker by saint.exe’). The post ToxicEye RAT exploits Telegram communications to steal data from victims appeared first on Security Affairs. Pierluigi Paganini.
The attackers attempted to trick the company’s customers into opening a ZIP archive filenamed “ crowdstrike-hotfix.zip.” ” The archive includes a loader named Hijack Loader used to execute the Remcos RAT. ” reads the report published by Kaspersky.
The malware was first spotted on February 9, 2022, when 360Netlab’s honeypot system captured an unknown ELF file that was spreading by exploiting the Log4J vulnerability. The name B1txor20 is based on the filename “b1t” used for the propagation and the XOR encryption algorithm, and the RC4 algorithm key length of 20 bytes.
The malware then enters “VM mode” to encrypt files with specific extensions. Once executed, the ransomware drops a text filenamed TargetInfo.txt that contains victim information. Like the Windows variant of the ransomware, the content of the file TargetInfo.txt is then sent to a C2 server.
Once encrypted a file, the ransomware appends the ‘ nightsky ‘ extension to encrypted filenames. Experts pointed out that the gang communicates with victims via email and a clear website running an instance of the Rocket.Chat. Source MalwareHunterTeam.
However, the fact that mutual communication and reliability were promoted through Facebook Messenger shows that the boldness of Kimsuky APT attacks is increasing day by day.” “And if you compare the two malicious file execution screens, you can see the same pattern. ” reads the report published by GSC.
IT back-office and communications systems, such as email have been taken offline at the time. The provided sample of exfiltrated files includes business data and documents, as well as Argus certificates and development files. The sample archive is password protected – but the filenames and types are clearly visible.
Figure 4: Piece of the encrypted file downloaded from “share.]dmca.]gripe”. Inside it, two filesnamed “filename1.vbs” Figure 5: Installed files. The content of the VBScript is straightforward: it simply is the launching point to run executable file. Figure 10: Piece of network communication intercepted.
While investigating a security incident from March 2024 on a client’s Linux host, Positive Technologies researchers discovered a filenamed “scrond.” The communication between GoRed and its C2 server relies on the RPC protocol.
The attackers attempted to trick the company’s customers into opening a ZIP archive filenamed “ crowdstrike-hotfix.zip.” ” The archive includes a loader named Hijack Loader used to execute the Remcos RAT. ” reads the report published by Kaspersky.
“The attack begins with a PowerShell command to retrieve a filenamed win_r.zip from another compromised server’s Outlook Web Access logon path (/owa/auth).” ” The attack used a PowerShell command to retrieve a filenamed win_r.zip from another compromised server’s Outlook Web Access logon path (/owa/auth). .
RansomHub claimed responsibility for attacks against multiple organizations, including Change Healthcare, Christie’s , and Frontier Communications. The experts at Insikt Group noticed that the ESXi version of RansomHub creates a filenamed /tmp/app.pid to ensure the exclusive execution of RansomHub processes.
The phishing emails in this campaign have carefully tailored subject lines, with a ZIP file attachment containing a decoy MSC filenamed RIPCOY. Upon opening this file, an obfuscated VBScript downloads multiple files from a public cloud service like AWS, including a decoy PDF,NET applications, and a configuration file.
The botnet shell script downloads an ELF filenamed “pty3” from a different IP address, likely a sample of Muhstik malware. top, which was observed in Muhstik botnet activities, and communicates via Internet Relay Chat. The bot also connects to the command and control domain p.findmeatthe[.]top,
The new variant discovered by Fortinet has the filename “Omicron Stats.exe,” threat actors are attempting to exploit the enormous interest on a global scale on the COVID-19 Omicron variant. Over the course of the few weeks after this variant was released, we noticed one IP address in particular communicating with this C2 server.”
. “Most employees have been trained to second-guess identities in email, but few know how to make sure that the name and photo they see in a Teams conversation are real. It is simple to edit a profile and become most anyone you like. ” concludes the report. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook. Pierluigi Paganini.
The main branch also has auxiliary modules that allow the Prometei botnet to communicate through TOR or I2P networks, to collect information about processes running on the system, check of open ports on target systems and to crawl the file systems in search for filenames given as the argument to the module.
The malware communicates with the C2 communications via POST HTTP requests and uses RC4 encryption with a hardcoded key encoded with Base64. The new infection chain starts by including just one LNK file in the ZIP archive attached to spear-phishing messages. The PyVil RAT stores the malware settings (i.e.
. “We also saw Mimikatz being executed on victim networks, as well as a Trojanized ZLib DLL that had multiple malicious exports, one of which appeared to be waiting for communication from a command-and-control (C&C) server, while the other would load a payload from the provided filename in the command-line.”
“Current malspam campaigns feature booby-trapped document filesnamed “COVID 19 relief” and subject lines relying on the same theme. Sphinx’s targets have not changed from its past configuration files as it continues to focus on banks in the US, Canada, and Australia.” ” continues the post.”Next,
The backdoor uses emails for C2 communications, where the C2 is the victim’s Microsoft Exchange server. The infection chain commenced with spear phishing messages using a zip filenamed Brochure.zip in attachment. ” reads the analysis published by Fortinet. It also acts as a proxy for the attacker to mask himself.”
But, unlike previous incidents using POWERSTATS, the command and control (C&C) communication and data exfiltration in this case is done by using the API of a cloud file hosting provider.” OS name, domain name, user name, IP address) into one long string. ” continues the experts.
In the attacks investigated by Palo Alto Networks, the APT group leveraged legitimate executables such as BITSAdmin to download an innocuous filenamed Aro.dat from a GitHub repository under the control of the threat actors. The analysis of the file revealed that it includes the encrypted and compressed PlugX payload.
a United States defense research entity, a Turkish government agency managing public works, several large technology and communications firms headquartered in Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and medical organizations/medical research facilities located in Japan and Canada). ” reads the analysis published by PaloAlto Networks.
According to Microsoft, the campaign aims at building capabilities that could disrupt critical communications infrastructure between the United States and Asia region in the case of future crises. “On May 29, the attackers returned and used a renamed version of ProcDump (filename: alg.exe) to dump credentials from LSASS.”
.” One of the variants analyzed by BleepingComputer encrypts data and appends the.promorad extension to encrypted files, then it creates ransom notes named _readme.txt as shown below. The Promorad Ransomware variant samples tested by the experts also download a filenamed 5.exe exe and executed it.
” Cannon acts as a downloader and relies on emails to communicate with the C2 server and receive instructions. Hackers used weaponized filesnamed ‘crash list (Lion Air Boeing 737).docx’ Once successfully executed, the macro will install a payload and save a document to the system.”
“In this new attack, the threat actor first externally scans a given IP range by sending a TCP SYN packet to port 2375, the default port used for communicating with the Docker daemon.” “The output of this command is saved into a filenamed ips.txt, which is then fed into the Docker.exe file.
The fake profiles asked the victims to open the weaponized excel filenamed ERFT-Details. The Tonedeaf malware is a backdoor which communicates with a single command-and-control (C2) server via HTTP GET and POST requests. xls that was used as a dropper.
The malicious code allows the attackers to download and execute files on the infected machine. “Interestingly, the backdoor communicates with the command and control (C2) server using the value of the Authorization HTTP header ” continues the analysis. The payload is executed the next time Windows starts up.”
At this stage we might appreciate two communication ways. One of the most important function is the aa_AdrGen_bb which is the communication manager. It implements the control layer in order to send and to receive control informations such as: commands, bytes received, if the file transfer has been close, and so on and so forth.
” reads an update published by the Irish Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications. The malware involved in the attack is Conti Ransomware v3 (32 bit), which attempted to encrypt all files with the exception of the following filenames: – CONTI_LOG.txt – readme.txt – *.FEEDC
Upon executing the core component, the malware first checks if its executable filename starts with “[k” If it does not, it performs the following routine: It redirects both stdout and stderr file descriptors to /dev/null. It sets the default handlers for SIGTERM, SIGINT, SIGBUS, SIGPIPE, and SIGIO signals.
FunnyDream is a custom-made backdoor that supports advanced persistence and communication capabilities, it was used by the APT group to gathering intelligence and data exfiltration. “The attackers used the backdoor prevalently as DLL files, but we observed an executable to be used as well.” ” continues the report.
The name Dacls comes from its filename and the hard-coded strings, the malware has a modular structure that could extend its capabilities by loading plugins. “With connection proxy, the number of target host connections can be reduced, and the communication between the target and the real C2 can be hidden.”
. “The archive contains two malicious DLL libraries as well as two legitimate executables that sideload the DLL files. We found multiple archives like this with filenames of government entities in Myanmar, for example “COVID-19 Case 12-11-2020(MOTC).rar” ” reads the analysis published by Kaspersky.
Figure 6: Deofuscated VBS file – Lampion trojan July 2020. Some parts of the code are highlighted in Figure 6 and described below: Function to generate random strings is used to generate arbitrary folders and filenames. LNK files from the Windows startup folder. VBS files from the Windows startup folder.
The executed crypto miner is the filenamed “” kswapd0 ” based on the famous XMRIG monero crypto miner. It is composed only by three files: “ a”, “run”, “stop ”. They are three bash scripts, which we start to analyze: Figure 10: Content of the “a” script file. The initial script is the filenamed “ a ”.
“This Gh0st RAT sample communicated with IP address 43 [. ] In all the cases, attackers deliver a WinRAR self-extracting (SFX) file that installs the SysUpdate stage 1 payload, that gains persistence and downloads and executes the second stage payload, SysUpdate Main. Windows NT 6.3; ” continues the analysis.
According to government experts, the Royal ransomware attacks targeted numerous critical infrastructure sectors including, manufacturing, communications, healthcare and public healthcare (HPH), and education. ReadMe filename: README.BlackSuit.txt. New #ransomware #BlackSuit targets Windows, #Linux. Extension: blacksuit.
On execution of the Simps binary, it drops a log file containing that the device has been infected with malware by Simps Botnet (see Figure 2). Figure 2: Dropped log file. Figure 3: C2 communication. Figure 10: keksec.infected.you.log file. The binary also connects to the C2 23.95.80[.]200 200 (see figure 3).
The CheckMate ransomware operators have been targeting the Server Message Block (SMB) communication protocol used for file sharing to compromise their victims’ networks. Once the attacker successfully logs in to a device, they encrypt data in shared folders and leave a ransom note with the filename “!CHECKMATE_DECRYPTION_README”
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